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Once a country joins a monetary union, an e￿cient competitiveness channel is commonly
considered to be the main substitute for the abandoned autonomous monetary and exchange rate
policy. This paper attempts to make an empirical assessment of how the price competitiveness of
domestic producers stabilizes the Polish and Slovak economies in comparison to the real interest
rate, that could potentially be procyclical in EMU. To address this issue, we revisit the econometric
studies of weighting the Monetary Conditions Index (MCI-ratio) to explore the relative importance
of the two channels. We apply the IS-curve approach and ￿ as opposed to previous MCI-ratio
literature ￿ we build a small open economy DSGE framework to be estimated with classical
forward-looking techniques (FIML). We compare the estimates and impulse-response functions
for Poland and Slovakia, concluding that the latter country seems to be more capable of handling
asymmetric demand shocks under the common monetary policy. At the same time, it remains more
vulnerable to asymmetric cost-push shocks. Also, we examine the consequences of a permanent
fall in the interest rates in the home economy after the accession to the monetary union. If there
was a natural interest rate disparity of 1 percentage point in favour of the catching-up economy
and agents expected a 30-year long period of closing this gap, our model would predict a terms
of trade appreciation for both countries in question, whereby the required appreciation would be
more pronounced for Poland than for Slovakia ( 9:9% and 2:6% respectively).
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21 Introduction
Once a country joins a monetary union, its capacity of absorbing asymmetric shocks via policy tools is
signi￿cantly reduced. Namely, it resigns from autonomous monetary policy and, to a large extent,
nominal exchange rate volatility. The burden of adjustment shifts to market-based mechanisms,
described in the literature as the competitiveness channel (de Grauwe, 2007; European Commission,
2008). After an asymmetric shock and in the absence of nominal exchange rate ￿uctuations, as well as
￿ne-tuning possibilities with country-speci￿c nominal interest rate, the speed of reversal to equilibrium
is mainly conditional on the price dynamics, and thus on market ￿exibility, intrinsic in￿ation persistence
and the process of forming expectations (see Tor￿j, 2009).
In addition, this reversal could be hampered by procyclicality of country-speci￿c real interest rates in
a monetary union. When a positive demand shock raises the in￿ation rate and there is a close link
between the in￿ation rate and in￿ation expectations on a country level, a real interest rate declines,
which additionally fuels the boom (European Commission, 2006). A positive impulse for the economic
activity can also stem from the fact that an economy with higher natural rate of interest joins a
monetary union where lower interest rate level prevails.
There are dynamic interactions between the competitiveness channel and the real interest rate e￿ect.
The former is commonly believed to be an equilibrating force in the long run, whereby the latter ￿ to
boost output and in￿ation volatility via short run e￿ects (Arnold and Kool, 2004; Roubini et al., 2007;
European Commission, 2008; W￿jcik, 2008). However, a joint consideration of both mechanisms seems
to be the appropriate approach to model the adjustment process in the aftermath of an asymmetric
shock (see e.g. Hoeller et al., 2004; European Commission, 2006; Tor￿j, 2009), as it provides better
insight into the adjustment dynamics in general.
This paper aims to contribute to the literature by performing an ex ante econometric assessment of the
adjustment capacity in Poland. Using historical data for the 1996-2009 period, it assesses the relative
sensitivity of the Polish economic activity to the real interest rate and real exchange rate changes.
For comparative reasons perform analogous estimations for Slovakia ￿ a new EU member state that
adopted the euro in 2009.
The Slovak case is of particular interest because of its ERM II experience. In the course of
ERM II participation, the Slovak Koruna was twice revalued. Despite the fact that its appreciation
was probably to a large extent in line with equilibrium, this may have partly a￿ected the price
competitiveness of Slovak goods on international markets. We attempt to establish a link between this
permanent appreciation, followed by revaluations, and the permanent fall in Slovak nominal interest
rates on their way to the euro area. In particular, we are interested whether these two shocks could
be o￿seting each other as a positive and negative demand shock. We also attempt to perform a
quantitative assessment of this o￿setting power.
The issue of the relative impact of the real exchange and interest rates on economic activity in a
small open economy has been heavily discussed at the turn of the centuries, when a concept of
Monetary Conditions Index (MCI) was popular among policymakers (see Freedman, 1994, 1995, for
the foundations of this concept). The main purpose of the MCI was to combine the interest rate













MCI_IS ￿ the MCI, MCI_IS_D and MCI_IS_U ￿ the MCI calculated with weights hitting upper and lower bound of
the con￿dence interval for the estimated MCI ratio respectively, MCI_RIR_HICP ￿ the real interest rate component
of the MCI (calculated ex post with contemporaneous y/y HICP dynamics), MCI_REERULC ￿ the real exchange rate
component of the MCI (de￿ated with unit labour costs).
Source: Tor￿j (2008).
with the exchange rate to provide a more adequate assessment of monetary policy stance for a small
economy than the interest rate only (see Figure 1 for the estimates for Poland). Out of a number
of econometric techniques developed for the purpose of MCI-ratio estimation (i.e. the impact of real
interest rate divided by the impact of real exchange rate), we adopt here the IS-curve approach, i.e. we
look at the relative importance of both variables in controlling the output gap dynamics. Our dynamic
IS curve is part of a micro-founded New Keynesian DSGE model.
Having estimated the MCI-ratios for Poland and Slovakia, we perform simulations of the adjustment
path after an asymmetric shock that hits both countries within the euro area. This can be seen as an
econometric approach to an ex ante assessment of the competitiveness channel’s e￿ciency in EMU,
delivering some complementary information to institutional characteristics of both economies. Also,
we argue that these ratios could provide some information on the required size of real appreciation
that could potentially o￿set the positive demand pressure from the natural interest rate di￿erential
between the new member states and the euro area under common monetary policy with lower interest
rates than in the NMS before the euro area entry.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews some stylized facts about Slovakia’s
road to the euro, as well as the literature on estimating the relative impact of the real interest rate
and the real exchange rate on the economic activity (MCI-ratio). In Section 3, a DSGE model is
developed. Section 4 contains the estimation results for Poland and Slovakia. In Section 5, the
in￿uence of MCI-ratio on the adjustment capacity after an asymmetric shock is assessed on the basis
of impulse-response functions. Section 6 investigates the mid-term consequences of natural interest
4rates misalignment and implications of central parity revaluation within the model developed in Section
3. Section 7 concludes.
2 Why does the MCI-ratio matter for the adjustment
dynamics?
The history of euro area enlargements (Greece 2001, Slovenia 2007, Cyprus and Malta 2008, Slovakia
2009) exhibits a remarkable pattern (see Figure 2). When we look at the GDP per capita on the eve
of euro adoption in individual countries, we can see a downward-sloping curve (with the only notable
exception of Cyprus in 2008). On January 1st 2009 Slovakia joined the monetary union at a record low
of 42% of euro area GDP per capita. If Poland had done the same in 2009, the Slovak record would
have been beaten by 9 percentage points.
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Source: Eurostat data.
One can think of two ways in which this discrepancy matters for the country under ECB’s common
monetary policy. Following the approach adopted by Flaig and Wollmersh￿user (2007) or Calmfors
(2007), we can di￿erentiate between two possible sorts of common interest rate misalignment: the
cyclical and the structural one.
Firstly, economies with low levels of income could possibly be characterized by di￿erent structures of
production and/or consumption than high-income economies. Empirical research con￿rms that this is
to some extent the case for Poland (Adamowicz et al., 2009). This makes such countries exposed to
asymmetric shocks after joining a monetary union. Once such a shock occurs, it would most probably
lead to a cyclical divergence in in￿ation. If a central bank in an autonomous monetary regime follows
a Taylor-type rule (Taylor, 1993), e.g. it = t +yyt (i ￿ nominal interest rate,  ￿ in￿ation rate, y
￿ output gap), it would bring the economy back to the unique equilibrium as long as it complies with
the Taylor principle, which requires a more than one-to-one response to in￿ation (  > 1).
However, with  < 1, sunspot equilibria may occur. In a monetary union the central bank is concerned
with the aggregate price stability. This means that in an example 2-country monetary union, it
5responds to a regional weighted average, t = w1t + (1   w)2t. Under these circumstances, the
response to the country-speci￿c in￿ation rate, w, could be far below 1. This argument lied at the
heart of ￿Walters critique￿ (Walters, 1994). However, the reasoning was incomplete because it left
aside open economy considerations. When the domestic producers are involved in international trade
and consumers could switch to imported products, an economy cannot a￿ord a boom that deteriorates
its competitiveness in the long run. It is the competitiveness channel that restores the long-term
equilibrium.
Secondly, the New Keynesian literature (e.g. Clarida et al., 1999; Gal￿, 2008) establishes a widespread
link between the natural interest rate (i.e. one that does not accelerate prices, in the spirit of Wicksell,
1907) and the level of an economy’s technology. European Central Bank (2004) enumerates the level
of an economy’s development among the most essential factors behind the natural rate of interest.
Countries with relatively lower income and productivity levels ￿ like Poland and Slovakia ￿ might
therefore exhibit higher levels of natural interest rates.
Indeed, Bencik (2009) estimates the natural level of Slovak interest rates in the long term at around
2:5 3:0%. This seems to exceed the level estimated by the European Central Bank (2004) for the euro
area in the interval of approximately 1% to 2%. The estimates by Brzoza-Brzezina (2003) suggest that
the disparity can even be higher in the case of Poland, with Polish natural interest rate possibly even
above 4%. A small economy that joins a monetary union whose level of interest rates is permanently
lower could therefore be hit by a long-lasting postitive internal demand shock.
In both cases, the impact of cyclical or structural stress in monetary policy crucially depends on the
sensitivity of economic activity to the discrepancy between the current real and the natural interest
rate level. In the New Keynesian literature (see e.g. Clarida et al., 1999; Gal￿, 2008) it is usually
modelled as an inverse function of intertemporal elasticity of substitution ( ).
Monetary policy stress was not the only demand disturbances on Slovakia’s road to the euro. In
the ERM II system, the Slovak koruna was twice revalued. The cumulative e￿ect amounted to
approximately 30% stronger currency over a of 2-year period (see Figure 3), and the ￿nal conversion
rate was in line with the terminal value for the central parity.
A permanent fall in nominal interest rates and a policy-induced deterioration of country’s
competitiveness might be considered as complementary shocks. Intuitively, a positive shock hitting the
economy via internal demand might be o￿set in terms of economic activity by a negative shock hitting
the external demand and the domestic price competitiveness in general. One might be interested in
the net e￿ect of both disturbances and, consequently, whether the choice of the ￿nal conversion rate
of the domestic currency into the euro could be considered as an adjustment policy tool on the way to
the euro. According to Bencik (2009), ￿...after Slovakia’s accession to the monetary union, there will
be a discrepancy between the neutral interest rate in the euro area and in Slovakia. It will be probably
necessary to o￿set the expansive in￿uence of interest rates by other economic policy instruments.￿
This paper attempts to formalize this argument and outline an empirical strategy to get the necessary
quantitative information, which in turn would make this argument operational. In particular, in order
to know how to o￿set such a set of shocks against each other, one needs to be aware of the relative


































































































Source: Eurostat and ECB data.
impact of real interest rate and real exchange rate on the domestic economy. In mid- to late 1990s,
this question was heavily discussed in the literature as the problem of estimating the ￿MCI-ratio￿.
The MCI (Monetary Conditions Index) is a weighted sum of real interest rate and real exchange rate.
This index is supposed to re￿ect the joint impact of both factors on the domestic economic activity
and evaluate the current monetary policy stance (Freedman, 1994, 1995). The econometric problem,
associated with the construction of the index is related to the di￿culties with the estimation of weights
for both variables. Their ratio is the parameter in question. A value less than one suggested that the
impact of the real exchange rate is stronger compared to the impact of real interest rate. The weights
should be chosen as multipliers of some target variable with respect to both real interest and exchange
rate. It was customary in the literature to select some measure of economic activity, e.g. the output
gap (Freedman, 1994), although some authors (Kokoszczy«ski, 2004) argued that the in￿ation rate
would be a preferable choice.
Specifying the index as a weighted average, we implicitly assume that both channels are perfectly
substitutable and work independently (Bo￿nger, 2001). As a consequence, econometric studies in this
￿eld mostly involve an estimation of an IS curve, with a measure of an output gap linearly explained
by real interest rate or real exchange rate (see e.g. Frochen, 1996; Mayes and Viren, 2000, 2002; Hyder
and Khan, 2007). This assumption has been heavily criticized, e.g. by Stevens (1998). Batini and
Turnbull (2002) attempted to amend this problem by implementing some additional interest rate and
exchange rate dynamics in the model, so as to measure the short to mid-term impact of monetary
conditions on the real economy.
Mayes and Viren (2002) argued that the MCI might be useful in the macroeconomic analysis of
monetary integration in Europe. However, due to a number of policy errors associated with monetary
policy conduct using MCI, especially in New Zealand (Drew, 2001; Mishkin and Schmidt-Hebbel,
2007; Svensson, 2001), the estimation of MCI-ratio was abandoned. It happened before the New Open
Macro progress came into the central banks’ modelling practice in the form of dynamic stochastic
general equilibrium models (DSGE). However, using this framework could help to better address the
deep econometric critique that Eika et al. (1996) formulated in response to models attempting to
7capture the MCI-ratio, i.e.:
 dynamic speci￿cation. A rigorous derivation allows applying empirically veri￿ed speci￿cation
and the sources of model dynamics are explicit. Moreover, rational expectations additionally
￿ne-tune this dynamics.
 parameter stability. DSGEs are commonly considered to be immune to the Lucas (1976)
critique. Even if it was not fully the case for the economies here in question, they place a number
of restrictions on a comparable VAR speci￿cation that allows us to pin down a relatively small
number of parameters in an economically sensible way. This is especially valuable when the
time series are short. Also, the presense of expectational terms allows us to apply the model for
counterfactual analyses of scenarios after the euro adoption.
 endogeneity. In a log-linearized New Keynesian system, there are at least 2 more equations
in addition to the IS curve: the Phillips curve and the nominal interest rate equation (Taylor
rule). The absence of the latter was particularly stressed by many authors as a potential source
of endogeneity bias (Eika et al., 1996; Gottschalk, 2001). The presence of the former allows us
to specify the real interest rate correctly, i.e. in an ex ante manner.
In this paper, we consider the IS curve approach, treating the output gap as the target variable.
We specify a New Keynesian small open economy DSGE model. It contains the features of interest:
competitiveness channel, separate in￿ation processes in the tradable and nontradable sector, Euler
equation establishing a dynamic link between present and future consumption via the ex ante real
interest rate, as well as common monetary policy. It turns out that an IS curve speci￿cation as a linear
equation with the real interest rate and the real exchange rate (in level; such as e.g. in Kot, 2003 or
Tor￿j, 2008) is dynamically inconsistent with the inter- and intratemporal optimizing setup. This is
why we estimate the Polish and Slovak MCI-ratio, taking into account (i) the interest rate parameter
in the Euler equation and (ii) the terms of trade parameter in the static equilibrium condition.
With our MCI-ratios, we simulate the dynamic responses of the Polish and Slovak economies to
asymmetric disturbances within a monetary union, as well as to the permanent fall in interest rates.
This brings us to the answer whether ￿ and to what extent ￿ procyclical real interest rates are dampened
by the competitiveness channel, and how the fall in nominal interest rates changes the relative prices
between the tradable sector and the rest of the monetary union.
3 DSGE model setup
The DSGE model developed here builds strongly upon the multi-region currency union models with
possible heterogeneity, such as e.g. ones considered in the works by Benigno (2004); Lombardo (2006);
Brissimis and Skotida (2008). The currency union consists of 2 regions. The whole economy of the
monetary union, in line with a conventional treatment in the DSGE literature 1, is represented by the
1See Benigno (2004); Blessing (2008); Kolasa (2008).
8interval [0;1], whereby the ￿rst region (say, home economy) is indexed over [0;w] (relative size of the
region: w), and the second (foreign economy) is indexed over [w;1].
As the behaviour of the nontradable sector is considered to be a crucial element of adjustment dynamics
(see e.g. European Commission, 2008, 2009), both economies consist of two sectors. Each of them is
characterized by price rigidities, modelled with Calvo (1983) mechanism. Conventionally, consumers
in each region maximize their utility and producers in each sector ￿ their present and discounted future
pro￿ts. International exchange of goods incorporates the competitiveness channel of adjustment into
the model and ensures that in the long run both economies return to their equilibrium after a shock.
This is also true for a small economy that does not have an autonomous monetary policy, which is
modelled for the entire currency union via a simple Taylor rule with smoothing.
While monetary policy is always symmetric (with a possibly asymmetric transmission mechanism
though), there are three other shocks in the model that can be asymmetric (region-speci￿c): demand
shocks (to consumption) and cost-push shocks, both in the tradable and non-tradable sector.
Henceforth, parameters of the foreign economy are denoted analogously to home economy and marked
with an asterisk, e.g.  and . Lowercase letters denote the log-deviations of their uppercase
counterparts from the steady-state values.
3.1 Household decisions
3.1.1 Intratemporal allocation of consumption
Households get utility from consumption and disutility from hours worked. In addition, utility from
consumption depends on consumption habits formed in the previous period (see Smets and Wouters,












where Ct ￿ consumption at t, Ht ￿ stock of consumption habits at t, Nt ￿ hours worked at t,  > 0
and  > 0. Consumption habits are assumed to be proportional to consumption at t   1 (see Smets
and Wouters, 2003):
Ht = hCt 1 (2)


















9where  2 (0;1) characterizes the share of nontradables in the home economy and  > 0 is elasticity
of consumption substitution between the goods produced in both sectors.


















An analogous relationship holds for the foreign economy. Given this,  is an intuitive measure of
degree of openness and 1    ￿ home bias in consumption.  > 0 is the elasticity of substitution
between home and foreign tradables.
A single type of good is indexed as k and belongs to good variety indexed over the interval [0;1].















































The parameter "T > 1 measures the elasticity of substitution between various types of goods in
international trade, k indexes the variety of goods, and j ￿ the households (integral over j re￿ects the
di￿erence in both economies’ size).

















































For both tradable consumption baskets (i.e. H and F), we de￿ne equal elasticity of substitution between
various types of goods, "T, both at home and abroad.













































10Consequently, "N and "N is de￿ned as elasticity of substitution between various types of nontradable
goods.




tU (Ct;Nt;Ht) ! max
C;N
(7)
where  2 (0;1) is households’ discount factor. Maximization of (7) is subject to a sequence of current




























N;t;kdj dk+Et fQt;t+1Dt+1g  Dt+WtNt
(8)
The right-hand side is a household’s budget at t. Its income consists of payo￿s of securities acquired in
the previous periods (Dt), labour incomes (Wt ￿ nominal wage for hours worked at t) and government
transfers (Tt). The left-hand side of the inequality sums the consumption spendings of households
(where P denotes a price of a particular consumption bundle, indexed in line with these bundles) and
acquisition of securities. Qt;t+1 is a stochastic discount factor for the payo￿s at t + 1, faced by the
households.
Maximizing (7) subject to (8) leads to the following ￿rst order conditions:
























































 demand equations (home and foreign) for domestic tradable goods:































 home and foreign demand equations for all tradable goods:

























































































































































































Log-linearization and di￿erencing the formulas (19) and (21) lead to the following dependencies:
T;t = (1   )H;t + F;t 
T;t = (1   )F;t + H;t (22)
12t = (1   )T;t + N;t 
t = (1   )
T;t + 
N;t (23)
Using the above equations, we derive domestic demand functions for the domestic tradable, foreign











































Analogous equations hold for the foreign economy.
3.1.2 Intertemporal allocation of consumption





where Vt;t+1 is the price at t of an Arrow security, i.e. a one-period security paying 1 at t + 1 when
a speci￿c state of nature occurs and 0 otherwise. t;t+1 is the probability that the state of nature
in which 1 is paid materializes, conditional on the state of nature at t. Having the access to such a
security market, households can transfer utility between periods, maximizing its discounted ￿ow (see
Gal￿ and Monacelli, 2005).
The optimality of decisions requires that the marginal loss in utility due to buying the security at
t instead of allocating this money to consumption must equal the discounted payo￿ at t + 1, also








whereby Ct+1 and Pt+1 in the above equation should be interpreted as conditional expected values
given the state of nature when the payo￿ is nonzero.










13We calculate the conditional expected value of both sides, which ￿ along with =t  Et (Qt;t+1) ￿ leads










Log-linearization of (30) around the steady state allows us to write the following dependence:
ct   hct 1 = Et (ct+1   hct)  
1   h

[it   (Etpt+1   pt) + ln] (31)
where lowercase variables are percentage deviations from the steady state for their uppercase










(it   Ett+1   ) (32)
where it   ln=t denotes short-term nominal interest rate at t, Ett+1 = Etpt+1   pt ￿ expected
domestic consumer price growth,  =  ln ￿ natural interest rate corresponding to the households’
discount factor .
3.2 International prices





Log-linearizing (33) around a symmetric steady state St = 1 ￿ the law of one price in the tradable
sector ￿ leads to the following relationship:
st = pH;t   pF;t (34)





An analogous approximation allows us to write:
xt = pT;t   pN;t (36)
Although this symmetric steady state might seem to be controversial in the case of country pairs
euro area vs Eastern Europe (Poland or Slovakia), it allows us to simplify the technical exposition
14substantially. When the steady state is asymmetric for some reason (e.g. persistent price level
di￿erentials due to heterogeneity in the level of economies’ development), then lnSt 6= 0 and equation
(34) takes the form:
st = pH;t   pF;t    s (37)
An asymmetric steady stade has twofold implications. Firstly, equality (37) implies that a constant
can appear in the equations containing st. The value  s could probably be treated in an analogous
manner to long-run equilibrium exchange rate in the sense of Williamson (1994), i.e. stabilizing the
current account and production at their steady-state levels.
Secondly, generalizing the framework of Gal￿ and Monacelli (2005) where a symmetric steady state
was assumed, we obtain the following log-linearization of the tradable price index de￿nition (19):
pT;t =
(1   )  S1 
(1   )  S1  + 
pH;t +

(1   )  S1  + 
pF;t  (1   ~ )pH;t + ~ pF;t (38)
Note that (38) simpli￿es to pt = (1   )pH;t +pF;t when the steady state is symmetric. In addition,
when the prices of domestic goods are lower than the foreign ones in the steady state (  S < 1), then
 < ~  if  < 1,  > ~  if  > 1 and like in the steady state if  = 1. Analogous conclusions apply to
the log-linearization of (21). Further derivations assume a symmetric steady state.
Using (37) and (38) we can write:
pT;t = pH;t   st (39)
pt = pT;t   xt (40)
The real exchange rate Qt (qt for log-deviation from the steady state) versus the rest of the monetary
union takes the form:
qt = pt   p
t = (1      )st   xt + x
t (41)
Real exchange rate appreciation is then linked to the appreciation of external terms of trade,
depreciation of domestic internal terms of trade (de￿ned as in (36)) and appreciation of foreign internal
terms of trade.
3.3 Producers
3.3.1 Real marginal costs












t is an exogenous technological process (analogously for the nontradable sector N).
Following Clarida et al. (1999), we assume away the price deviations of individual varieties within a
sector as of second-order importance in the proximity of the steady state. This allows us to integrate
the formulas (42) and (43) into sectoral production functions. It implies a real marginal cost, common
for producers in a given sector, calculated as:
mcH
t = wt   pH;t   aH
t (44)
mcN
t = wt   pN;t   aN
t (45)
with wt ￿ wages in the home economy (expressed as log-deviations from the steady state).
Using log-linearized de￿nitions of price aggregates (19) and (21) and the labour supply condition (16)
we get:
mcH
t = (wt   pt) + (pt   pT;t) + (pT;t   pH;t)   aH
t = ct + nt   st   xt   aH
t (46)
mcN
t = (wt   pt) + (pt   pT;t) + (pT;t   pN;t)   aN
t = ct + nt + (1   )xt   aN
t (47)
Aggregating (42) and (43) over the good types k and assuming identical technologies across all


























t +(1   )nH
t = yN
t +(1   )yH
t  aN
t  (1   )aH
t
(48)
The approximation makes use of steady-state technological symmetry between the sectors. Substituting
this into (46) and (47) yields:
mcH
t = ct + 

yN
t + (1   )yH
t





t = ct + 

yN
t + (1   )yH
t

+ (1   )xt   (1   )aH
t   (1 + )aN
t (50)
163.3.2 Pricing decisions
There are price rigidities in the economy. Following the usual approach in the New Keynesian literature,
we model them by means of the Calvo (1983) scheme. In a given period, a fraction  of producers are
not allowed to reoptimize their prices in reaction to economic innovations and must sell at the price
from the previous period. The probability of being allowed to reoptimize the price is equal across
producers: 1    in each period, independently of the amount of time elapsed since the last price
change.
Some of the producers allowed to change their price do not really reoptimize. Following Gal￿ and
Gertler (1999) we assume that the change in price is partly implemented as an indexation to past
in￿ation. This mechanism leads to a hybrid Phillips curve (see Gal￿ and Gertler (1999); Gal￿ et al.
(2001)), empirically outperforming the purely forward-looking speci￿cations in terms of goodness-of-￿t.
Following Kolasa (2008), in￿ation is modelled separately in the tradable and nontradable sector.
As Gal￿ and Gertler (1999) we assume that a fraction 1  of producers are able to change their price















t and  pN
t denote the prices set newly at t by the 1    fraction of producers. Among the
producers who reoptimize prices there is a fraction of 1 ! producers reoptimizing in an anticipatory
manner as in Calvo (1983). They maximize the discounted ￿ow of future pro￿ts, using all information
available at the time of decision and taking into account future constraints. The rest of producers ( !)














Prices set by the latter group of producers are modelled, as in Gal￿ and Gertler (1999), as reoptimized
prices from the previous period, indexed to past in￿ation:
pH
b;t =  pH
t 1 + H
t 1 pN
b;t =  pN
t 1 + N
t 1 (53)
One can show (see Gal￿ and Gertler, 1999; Gal￿ et al., 2001; Gal￿, 2008 for details) that the reoptimized
prices satisfy the following conditions:
pH



























17where T   ln "
T
"T 1 and N   ln "
N
"N 1 are log-markups in the steady state (or markups in an
economy without price rigidities), mct ￿ real marginal cost at t.

































where mct now denote the deviation of real marginal cost from its long-run value in the respective
sector (analogously for the foreign economy).
3.4 Market clearing conditions
Equilibrium on the world markets of individual goods requires equality of overall production and
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Log-linearizing around the steady state and using (41) leads to the following equilibrium condition:
18yH
t = (1   )(1   )ct + 1 w
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(61)
An analogous condition can be written for the foreign economy:
yF
t = (1   )(1   )c
t + w
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(62)
Market clearing conditions for the nontradable sector can be written using (11) as:

















Using the de￿nition of internal terms of trade, (35), we get:
YN;t = X
(1 )
t Ct Y 







Log-linearizing (64) around the steady state leads to the following equilibrium conditions:
yN
t = (1   )xt + ct yN
t =  (1   )x
t + c
t (65)
In further analyses, we treat all the log-linearized variables as deviations from a ￿natural￿ state of
economy, driven by the exogenous technological processes aT
t and aN
t and undistorted by price relations.
We therefore ignore aT
t and aN
t and treat yT
t and yN
t as output gaps in each sector.
3.5 Monetary policy
The central bank’s monetary policy is described by a Taylor (1993) rule with smoothing, which is a
commonly applied description in the literature and empirically tested as an adequate tool for both
the euro area (Sauer and Sturm, 2003) and Poland (see i.a. Kolasa, 2008; Gradzewicz and Makarski,
2009). The common nominal interest rate is set according to the equation:
it =  + (1   )(~ t + y~ yt) + it 1 (66)
where it ￿ central bank policy rate at t, ~ yt ￿ the output gap in a currency union, ~ t ￿ in￿ation rate in
a currency union,  2 (0;1) ￿ smoothing parameter,  > 1; y > 0 ￿ parameters of central bank’s
response to deviations of in￿ation and output from the equilibrium levels. The condition  > 1 is
necessary to satisfy the Taylor rule (Taylor, 1993), leading to a unique equilibrium.













In practice, for a ￿nite number of economies, country weights (vector wn1) re￿ect relative sizes of
economies (in a 2-country case: w and 1   w).
3.6 Model equations
The log-linearized dynamic model is composed of the Euler equation for consumption (32), sectoral
Phillips curves (56) and (57), real marginal cost (49) and (50) along with their foreign counterparts,
equilibrium conditions (61), (62) and (65), equation of common monetary policy (66) and a set of
identities de￿ning the aggregate values for the monetary union (67) and (68), aggregate price dynamics
and de￿ators.
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t, interpreted as the monetary policy shock.

4 Estimation
The presence of expectational components in the model requires using speci￿c estimation techniques.
As shown in Tor￿j (2009), careful estimation of forward- and backward-looking parameters in the Euler
and Phillips curves is critical for accurate modelling of adjustment dynamics after asymmetric shocks.
In the literature, there are two standard manners of handling this problem. Firstly, following a
seminal paper of Gal￿ and Gertler (1999), the system can be estimated equation-by-equation using
the generalized method of moments (GMM, see Hansen, 1982). Secondly, one can specify a closed
20system and solve out the forward-looking components using standard algorithms (Blanchard and Kahn,
1980; Klein, 2000; Sims, 2001) and estimate the log-linearized system as a structural VAR, either with
classical or Bayesian methods. The classical approach is based on full information maximum likelihood
(FIML) estimation.
It is commonly argued that the latter approach outperforms the former in a number of aspects:
 the choice of instruments is usually arbitrary; they can be weak (Staiger and Stock, 1997; Shea,
1997; Stock and Yogo, 2003), non-orthogonal or too many (in the last case, it can lead to
spuriously signi￿cant estimates - see e.g. Baum et al., 2003);
 in a number of New Keynesian studies, problems with identi￿cation of structural parameters
have been risen (Mavroeidis, 2005; Nason and Smith, 2005);
 single equation GMM is a limited information method, inferior to system estimation in fully
speci￿ed multi-equation rational expectations framework (Fuhrer and Rudebusch, 2004; LindØ,
2005; Mavroeidis, 2005);
 in the case of an Euler equation, multiple expectational terms must be instrumentalized in a
single equation (Fuhrer and Rudebusch, 2004).
Although Monte Carlo studies of Fuhrer and Rudebusch (2004) and LindØ (2005) con￿rmed the
superiority of FIML over GMM in relatively basic New Keynesian systems such as a closed-economy,
3-equation trinity model, the FIML method is not free of drawbacks. It is based on the assumption of
normally distributed disturbances. Also, it requires a careful selection of starting values for parameters
in the maximization procedure, possibly close to the global maximum. Nonetheless, due to severity of
potential problems with GMM estimation ￿ especially with remarkably short data samples available
for Poland and Slovakia ￿ we apply the FIML approach in this study.
The log-linearized model can be summarized in a matrix form as:
AEtxt+1 = Bxt + C"t (69)
The model is solved under the assumption of expectations rationality into the following form (Blanchard
and Kahn, 1980; Klein, 2000):
xt = Mxt 1 + Ezt + N"t (70)
where Mn1n1 (A;B;C) and Nn1n1 (A;B;C), n1 ￿ number of endogenous variables in the reduced
system. Solving out identities (e.g. price de￿ator equations) in order to obtain a square matrix
N requires to push some lagged variables (price relations) into an exogenous vector zt of length
k, accompanied by a matrix of coe￿cients En1k (A;B;C), also being a function of deep model
parameters.
21In rational expectations models, it is common to assume AR(1) residuals by construction (see e.g.
Mavroeidis, 2005, for motivation):
"t = "t 1 + t (71)
where  has nonexplosive eigenvalues and "  N (0;D).



















Function (72) is maximized iteratively with respect to structural parameters of the model, contained in
matrices A and B, as well as to parameters describing the stochastic properties of the shocks,  and D.
The solution of the model is a unique mapping from these parameters to matrices M, N and E, that
are associated with the estimated SVAR model being ￿t to observable data. Note that the employed
estimation procedure places enough restrictions to parametrise this model relatively parsimoniously
and to identify the structural disturbances.
The vector of starting values for the iterative procedure has been calibrated in accordance with data
and the previous literature (see Table (1)).
The model is estimated in two region pairs:
 euro area and Poland (w = 0:03);
 euro area and Slovakia (w = 0:005),
whereby the calibration of weights re￿ects relative real GDP as 2000-2008 average.
In order to ￿t it to the data over the period 1996q2-2009q3, when Poland and (most of the time)
Slovakia were not the euro area members, some necessary adjustments in the model structure need to
be done:
 Every region leads an autonomous monetary policy. The smaller region (Poland or Slovakia) has
therefore its own Taylor rule.
 As a consequence, the driving variable in country-speci￿c Euler equations is the country-speci￿c
nominal interest rate.
 There are nominal exchange rate ￿uctuations between the two regions. The nominal exchange
rate is an endogenous variable, given by the following di￿erence equation re￿ecting the simple
uncovered interest parity condition:
et = Etet+1 + it   i
t + "e
t
22Table 1: Calibration of the starting values for FIML
Parameter \ Region Calibration and source
consumption habits (h) 0.59 (Smets and Wouters, 2003, estimates for EA)
impatience () 0.99 (Kolasa, 2008, calibrated for PL/EA)
elasticity of substitution H/F
()
1.5 (Lipi«ska, 2008, calibrated for CZ)
elasticity of substitution
T/NT ()
0.5 (Lipi«ska, 2008, calibrated for CZ)
price indexation in T (!T) 0.21 (EA), 0.28 (PL/SK) (Kolasa, 2008, estimates
for PL/EA)
price indexation in NT (!N) 0.162 (Kolasa, 2008, estimates for PL/EA)
price rigidities in T (T) 0.49 (EA), 0.55 (PL/SK) (Kolasa, 2008, estimates
for PL/EA)




1.91 (EA), 1.94 (PL/SK) (Kolasa, 2008, estimates
for PL/EA)
labour supply elasticity () 4 (Lipi«ska, 2008, calibrated for CZ)
CB response to in￿ation () 1.5 (EA), 1.31 (PL) (Gradzewicz and Makarski,
2009, estimates for PL/EA)
CB response to output (y) 0.46 (EA), 0.21 (PL) (Gradzewicz and Makarski,
2009, estimates for PL/EA)
CB smoothing () 0.71 (EA), 0.76 (PL/SK)(Gradzewicz and
Makarski, 2009, estimates for PL/EA)
serial correlation of demand
shock (c)
0.5 (based on LindØ, 2005)
serial correlation of T
in￿ation shock (T)
0.1 (based on LindØ, 2005)
serial correlation of NT
in￿ation shock (NT)
0.1 (based on LindØ, 2005)
serial correlation of monetary
policy shock (i)
0.8 (based on LindØ, 2005)
Source: author.
23Table 2: Data sample (1996q2-2009q2)










due to longer data
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Eurostat









EUR/PLN, EUR/SKK log, demeaned Eurostat
Source: author.
 Therefore, the logarithmic terms of trade de￿nition is reformulated with the nominal exchange
rate et as another component.
The model was ￿tted using data on consumption, interest rates, nominal exchange rate and sectoral
in￿ation rates (see Table (2)). Consumption and price indices were log-di￿erenced and demeaned. The
nominal exchange rate series in logarithms was demeaned. Due to strong seasonal e￿ects in HICP in
the ￿rst quarter of every year (at least in 1990s) in Slovakia, this series was seasonally adjusted using
TRAMO/SEATS.
The data needed some additional adjustment due to disin￿ationary e￿ects in Poland and Slovakia over
the sample period that make the series nonstationary.
 In the case of Poland, the interest rate and nontradable in￿ation series were detrended using
the National Bank of Poland’s data on in￿ation target. This data is not continuous in quarterly
terms, and it was smoothed using the Hodrick-Prescott ￿lter.
 No such data is available for Slovakia, as there was no explicit in￿ation targeting strategy until
early 2005 (NBS, 2004). Instead, the main monetary policy objective was de￿ned as a low
in￿ation rate that would allow the ful￿lment of the Maastricht criterion. This is why we interpret
the Slovak disin￿ation as an element of euro adoption strategy. In consequence, we disentangle
the nominal interest rate on the Slovak money market into an element due to convergence to the
euro area and an the residual component of regular monetary policy and policy shocks. We do
this by estimating the following equation of Slovak interest rate convergence to the euro area:
4it = ^ SK (it   i
t) + ^ 4it
24Table 3: FIML estimates of model parameters
Parameter \ Region PL SK EA
calibrated values
openness () 0.480 0.899 0.010
share of NT sector () 0.263 0.310 0.401
estimated values
consumption habits (h) 0.465 0.564 0.522
impatience () 0.978 0.999 0.989
elasticity of substitution H/F () 0.294 1.136 0.608 (vs PL) / 1.100 (vs SK)
elasticity of substitution T/NT () 0.505 0.558 0.611
price indexation in T (!T) 0.304 0.534 0.288
price indexation in NT (!N) 0.441 0.249 0.458
price rigidities in T (T) 0.579 0.585 0.665
price rigidities in NT (N) 0.803 0.990 0.768
elasticity of intertemporal substitution () 1.592 2.157 1.958
disutility from work () 3.621 2.308 3.378
CB response to in￿ation () 1.170 1.086 1.784
CB response to output (y) 0.484 0.350 0.498
CB smoothing () 0.614 0.471 0.487
serial correlation of demand shock (c) 0.499 0.435 0.392
serial correlation of T in￿ation shock ( T) 0.096 0.084 0.108
serial correlation of NT in￿ation shock ( NT) 0.100 0.050 0.114
serial correlation of monetary policy shock ( i) 0.402 0.613 0.607
variance of demand shock (2
c) 0.094 0.875 0.780
variance of T in￿ation shock (2
T) 1.294 0.921 0.579
variance of NT in￿ation shock (2
NT) 0.800 0.782 0.755
variance of monetary policy shock ( 2
i ) 1.257 1.025 0.774
variance of UIP shock (2
e) 1.152 0.909 -
All standard errors of the structural parameters, computed via the Hessian method (see e.g. Calzolari
and Panattoni, 1988), are lower than 0:01.
Source: author.
We obtain an estimate of ^ SK =  0:031 (with a standard error 0:02). Using the values of ^ 4it
and the terminal value of i2009Q1 = i
2009Q1, we construct the ￿net of convergence￿ component of
the nominal interest rate. We also use the other, ￿convergence￿ component to detrend the data
on in￿ation in nontradables.
Note that we do not detrend the data on tradable in￿ation. Both ADF and KPSS tests con￿rm that
these series are stationary for both Poland and Slovakia. Furthermore, such detrending would distort
the inference regarding the competitiveness channel. As noted by Stevens (1998) in his MCI-ratio
considerations, in￿ation rates of tradable and nontradable goods seem to be completely di￿erent
processes and the data used con￿rm this view.
Finally, to ensure a more e￿cient estimation with relatively short time series, we calibrate 2 model
parameters for each region. Following Kolasa (2008), we set  as a corresponding measure of economies’
openness and  as the share of services in the HICP basket (both averaged over 2000-2008).
25Table 3 contains the estimation results. The dynamic properties of the adjustment process hinge
mainly on the strength of consumption habits (h) and Phillips curve parametrisation (price indexation
! and Calvo probabilites ). In the former case, the estimates for both countries lie within a narrow
range aroud the estimate for the euro area ( 0:52): 0:47 for Poland and 0:56 for Slovakia.
However, both countries di￿er in terms of market rigidities. Product market rigidity in the nontradable
sector (as measured by the estimated Calvo probability) has turned out to be higher in both regions
than in the euro area. In the case of Slovakia, the Calvo probability in the nontradable sector seems
to be extremely high (0:99). In Poland it is remarkably lower (0:80), but still exceeds the one for the
euro area (0:77). As we do not explicitly model here the labour market mechanisms, one might in fact
presume that these parameter values capture the e￿ects of price and wage stickiness jointly. On the
other hand, the Calvo parameter in the tradable sector in Poland ( 0:58) is almost equal to the Slovak
one (0:59). Both estimates lie somewhat below the one for the euro area ( 0:66). Unsurprisingly, three
regions in question exhibit more price rigidity in the nontradable sector than in the tradable sector.
In terms of estimated intrinsic in￿ation persistence, Poland seems to be more similar to the euro area
than Slovakia. In the tradable sector, the fraction of backward-looking price setters amounts to 0:304
(against 0:288 in the euro area). In line with expectations and empirical evidence from other studies,
the respective estimates for the Phillips curves of the nontradable goods producers are remarkably
higher: 0:441 (Poland) and 0:458 (euro area). Against this background, the outcomes for Slovakia are
relatively surprising. They suggest a higher persistence in the tradable sector (at 0:534) and lower in
the nontradable one (at 0:249). This might result from a high share of administered prices over the
sample period.
These results, however, need to be treated with much prudence in the inference about future adjustment
capacity of both economies in the case of asymmetric shocks. Firstly, the sample covers almost 14 years
in which both economies in transition were deeply reformed, including the ￿eld of market regulations.
Secondly, the parameter of intrinsic in￿ation persistence is argued to be regime-dependent and not
immune to Lucas (1976) critique. As shown by Benati (2008), this is particularly the case when it
comes to the monetary integration in Europe.
In terms of the main factors that a￿ect the competitiveness channel, Slovakia seems to be better
equipped with adjustment capacity than Poland. This is above all due to high elasticity of substitution
between foreign and domestic tradable goods ( 1:136 in Slovakia and only 0:294 in Poland). This makes
the economic activity in Poland less sensitive to real appreciations or depreciations required to restore
the equilibrium in the monetary union. This result is accompanied by a lower degree of openness
to foreign consumption. Also, euro area’s elasticities of substitution between domestic and Polish or
Slovak goods show that Slovak goods are closer subsitutes for euro area consumers (at 1:100 elasticity)
than Polish goods (0:608). As a result, the Polish economy is less sensitive to real appreciation or
depreciation, which implies a longer period of adjustment via competitiveness channel than in Slovakia.
On the other hand, the elasticity of substitution between tradable and nontradable goods in Poland
and Slovakia are comparable (0:505 and 0:558 respectively, against 0:611 in the euro area).
The elasticity of intertemporal substitution in Poland ( ^  = 1:592) is lower than in Slovakia (^  = 2:157).
This result suggests that the economy can be more sensitive to the real interest rates in Poland than
26Table 4: Estimated ￿MCI-ratio￿ for Poland and Slovakia
PL SK
interest rate parameter in
Euler curve
0.229 [0.000] 0.136 [0.000]
terms of trade parameter in
equilibrium condition
0.177 [0.000] 1.107 [0.000]
MCI-ratio 1.293 0.123
Test for signi￿cance: p-values in brackets.
Source: author.
in Slovakia. As a result, it can be more exposed to the procyclical e￿ects of the real interest rate
mechanism, especially given the fact that the e￿ciency of the competitiveness channel would probably
be lower.
The estimated, micro-founded model does not correspond to the MCI-ratio analyses based on
reduced-form IS curves, incorporating measures of both real interest rate and real exchange rate on
the right-hand side and a measure of output gap on the left-hand side of the equation (see e.g. Kot,
2003; Tor￿j, 2008). However, we attempt to construct an analog of this relation by picking:
 the interest rate parameter in the Euler equation (31), 1 h
(1+h);
 the terms of trade parameter in the equilibrium condition on the market of domestic tradable
goods (61), 1 w
w  (1   )(1   )   
h




This MCI-ratio (de￿ned as the ratio of interest rate parameter to terms of trade parameter), based on
our estimates, has been calculated in Table 4. It follows that the relative sensitivity of Polish economic
activity to the real interest rate in comparison to the terms of trade ( 1:293) remarkably exceeds the
analogous relation in Slovakia (0:123). These estimates suggest that the mid-term dominance of the
competitiveness channel over the real interest rate e￿ect could emerge more e￿ectively in Slovakia than
in Poland.
5 Adjustment dynamics under EMU: simulation analysis
The estimated model parameters (Table 3) are used to simulate impulse-response functions to
asymmetric demand and cost-push shocks in the home (Polish or Slovak) economy. In order to keep
the comparative perspective, the magnitude of the shocks for both countries are set to 1. In the case
of demand shocks (Figure 4), this corresponds to a sudden 1% increase in consumption (a positive
shock). For cost push shocks in the tradable and nontradable sector (Figures 5 and 6 respectively)
this means a surprise 1 percentage point increase in sector-speci￿c in￿ation (a negative shock).
In every case, the response of common monetary policy to country-speci￿c domestic shocks is negligible.
As the nominal interest rate remains virtually unchanged, we concentrate on alternative adjustment
channels.
27Impulse-response functions after an asymmetric demand shock con￿rm the general insight from the
estimation results: the competitiveness channel in Slovakia seems to be more e￿ective, as the response
of most categories in consideration is ￿atter and they return more quickly to the steady state than
in Poland. In particular, Poland needs a deeper response in terms of trade in order to restore the
equilibrium. There is also more volatility in internal terms of trade, as well as tradable and nontradable
in￿ation rates. The realignment after a period of overheating is visible in the nontradable production,
as well as in consumption, where some mid-term drop can be observed as a consequence. This is also
the case for both tradable and nontradable in￿ation.
Note the most remarkable di￿erence in impulse-response functions in tradable output of both
economies. In Poland, the positive demand shock is accomodated more slowly and the deviation
of output from the steady state remains positive over the ￿rst few quarters. On the contrary, Slovak
output already drops one period after the shock occured. The response of the competitiveness channel
is immediate and deep, con￿rming that in a highly open and exchange rate sensitive economy it can
act very e￿ectively as a replacement for the autonomous monetary policy. The Slovak tradable output
starts growing after the hump in terms of trade erodes.
A di￿erent picture emerges when we analyze the cost-push shocks in the tradable sector (Figure 5).
Here, Slovakia turns out to be relatively worse equipped with its (i) more open and exports-dependent
economy and (ii) relatively high in￿ation persistence (compare our previous results in Tor￿j, 2009, for
the EA12 countries). This is why we can observe a deep drop in tradable output in Slovakia, while its
Polish counterpart su￿ers relatively moderately from an adverse supply shock. This shock is a direct
hit to the country’s competitiveness, provided that it is asymmetric. This would not be the case for oil
shocks, but it might matter after sectoral shocks (as in the car industry for Slovakia) or disturbances
stemming from the labour market.
In both countries, the appreciated terms of trade gradually fall towards the steady-state value (the
adjustment seems to be slightly slower in Slovakia due to higher estimated in￿ation persistence).
However, there are two remarkable di￿erences in the realignment after an adverse cost-push shock in
the tradable sector. Firstly, Polish consumers switch more eagerly to nontradable goods. The e￿ect of
nontradable output growth is additionally boosted by procyclical the real interest rate e￿ect induced
by a transitory in￿ation growth (note the hump-shaped responses of consumption). As a result, Polish
nontradable sector plays a more signi￿cant role in rebalancing the economy (note the deep reaction in
internal terms of trade).
Secondly, note a deeper drop in consumption in Poland than in Slovakia. Higher elasticity of
substitution between foreign and domestic tradable goods allows the consumers to swich to goods
imported from the euro area and thereby smooth their consumption more e￿ciently. The Polish
economy is less open and the elasticity of substitution against the euro area is lower, which leads to a
deeper drop. These responses obviously imply that Slovakia could run higher current account de￿cits
after cost-push shocks in the euro area.
28Figure 4: Impulse-response functions for PL/SK after an asymmetric demand shock
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29Figure 5: Impulse-response functions for PL/SK after an asymmetric cost-push shock in T
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30Figure 6 completes the picture with dynamic responses to a cost-push shocks in the nontradable
sector. These shocks do not matter directly for the adjustment process. However, they are not
directly addressed by either common monetary policy (focused on the foreign big economy) or the
competitiveness channel (focused on the tradable sector), so they might have particularly persistent
e￿ects.
Directly after the shock, both economies face a similar drop in nontradable output and a hump-shaped
internal terms of trade depreciation. In Slovakia, due to higher rigidities in the nontradable sector,
the volatilities in responses seem to slightly exceed their Polish counterparts.
Interestingly, there is a qualitative di￿erence in the response of the tradable sector in our setup. In
Slovakia, consumers substitute more expensive nontradable goods with tradables, both domestic and
imported from the euro area ￿ in comparable amounts. In Poland, they focus on domestic tradables. As
a result, domestic tradable output grows (contrary to what is happening in Slovakia). Higher demand
for domestic tradables induces in￿ation and a consequent external terms of trade appreciation. Note
that the in￿ation growth in both sectors causes a bust of a high magnitude, which is illustrated by the
dynamic response of consumption. In Slovakia, the size of nontradable sector is lower (as compared to
Poland), so that the e￿ects do not spread to the tradable sector to such an extent. The real interest
rate e￿ect is weaker, economic slowdown begins immediately and external terms of trade depreciate,
restoring the equilibrium more quickly.
6 MCI-ratio and adjustment to permanent interest rate shock
We use the DSGE model derived in Section 3 and estimated in Section 4 to address the issue of
structural misalignment in monetary policy for both Central European economies in question. In
particular, we are interested in the consequences of a permanent interest rate fall after the accession to
the euro area. According to the estimates of Flaig and Wollmersh￿user (2007) and Calmfors (2007), a
number of lower-income economies have probably su￿ered from a structural stress in the initial years
after the euro adoption.
Reconsider the region-speci￿c Euler curve (32), containing it as an autonomous policy rate in the home
economy. Assuming that the home economy is in its zero-in￿ation steady state, it equals , i.e. the




(1+h) (it   Ett+1   ) + "c
t
Let i    denote an exogenous shift associated with the euro adoption and switch to the common




(1+h) (it   Ett+1   ) +
h
"c
t   i 1 h
(1+h)
i
In the simulations, we set the fall in nominal interest rates to 1 p.p. in annual terms, which corresponds
to i =  0:25 [p. p.] in our quarterly model. To keep the results comparable, we apply the same
31Figure 6: Impulse-response functions for PL/SK after an asymmetric cost-push shock in NT
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32shock for the Polish and the Slovak economy. However, the magnitude of the results di￿ers according
to what natural interest rate disparity one might assume for each of these countries.
A critical point in this simulation is calibrating the persistence of this shock. It is highly implausible
(and numerically more challenging) to assume that the shock would last forever. The catching-up
process will probably tend to close the natural interest rate disparity, at least when we do not take
into account other factors possibly involved. This implies the shock’s serial correlation below unity.
An exact value strongly depends on an arbitrary assumption of how long the process of technological
convergence would last. In what follows, we assume the serial correlation in the demand shock c =
0:962, which corresponds to a scenario where 99% real convergence would materialize itself within 30
years. Sensitivity of the main result to this assumption has been tested in Table 5.
It needs perhaps to be stressed that this shock persistence a￿ects the results of the simulations mainly
via the channel of agents’ expectations. As the adjustment to the new mid-term ￿steady state￿ is
relatively quick (approximately 2-3 years), the e￿ects of this shock dying out and reversal are not yet
observable.
The results of the simulation are presented in Figure 7. In the upper panels, the response of
main macroeconomic characteristics of the region are presented for Poland (left-hand) and Slovakia
(right-hand). We can disentangle the realignment into several aspects:
1. Permanent terms of trade appreciation. When the economic activity is constantly boosted
by the low nominal interest rate, the competitiveness channel must counteract this e￿ect by
reducing the external demand. This can only be achieved when the terms of trade appreciate. The
size of this permanent appreciation is a function of many model parameters, but the estimated
MCI-ratio plays here the most prominent role.
An estimated appreciation of 9:94% in Poland and 2:6% in Slovakia in not surprising. On the
one hand, the impact of the shock depends on the intertemporal elasticity of substitution, the
main determinant of MCI-ratio’s numerator. On the other hand, the required terms of trade
appreciation that counterbalances this impulse is all the more pronounced, the less sensitive an
economy is to external real appreciation.
These numbers rest on the assumption that the expected period of closing the natural interest
rate gap is 30 years. Taking into account an interval of 25 to 50 years, it might di￿er from 8:4%
to 16:7% for Poland and from 2:2% to 4:3% for Slovakia.
2. Opening (or deepening) a current account de￿cit. The impact on consumption clearly
exceeds the e￿ect on output in both sectors. This leads to a persistent current account de￿cit.
The access to the savings of the foreign big economy is necessary to keep the interest rate low.
This e￿ect is perfectly in line with the experience of catching-up economies within the euro area
(such as Greece or Portugal; see e.g. Fagan and Gaspar, 2007). Importantly, our model does not
contain any corrective mechanism for the current account or net foreign asset stock in the home
economy. According to Blanchard and Giavazzi (2002), ￿up to a ￿rst order￿ this should not be
seen as inherently problematic. Indeed, the questions about thresholds and mechanisms of such
correction in a monetary union remain, to the best of our knowledge, without any consensus
33answer in the literature today. One possible implementation would be to introduce collateral
constraints for households into the model.
3. Vague impact on the nontradable sector. Simulation results for both economies di￿er
qualitatively. In Poland, the internal terms of trade slightly depreciated, while in Slovakia ￿
slightly appreciated. This can be seen as an indirect e￿ect associated with sectoral rebalancing
in response to external terms of trade appreciation, required by the competitiveness channel.
The impact is a function of a set of structural parameters, mainly the elasticity of substitution
between the tradable and nontradable goods of domestic households.
4. Possible drop in the tradable output. There is a qualitative di￿erence between Poland and
Slovakia in terms of the new tradable output level after the permanent shock under consideration.
While the Polish output of tradable goods grew slightly, the Slovak one dropped. The reason for
this is similar to the motivation of the di￿ering patterns of adjustment of this variable after an
asymmetric demand shock. The e￿ect in Poland is mainly driven by rising domestic demand.
Consumers are less discouraged to buy domestic products due to lower elasticity of substitution
between Polish goods and goods imported from the euro area (the same applies to the consumers
in the euro area). Lower openness of the economy makes this e￿ect additionally limited. On the
other hand, permanently appreciated terms of trade hit the Slovak exporting sector, leading to
its contraction in the mid-term.
In the lower panels of Figure 7, an alternative adjustment scenario is considered. Instead of a
fully market-based transition to the new mid-term equilibrium (dashed lines), it is assumed that
policymakers know how much the terms of trade will need to appreciate on a permanent basis. This
shift is precisely applied in conjunction with the interest rate shock. It would be equivalent to setting
the conversion rate of the national currency against the euro (or the central parity) at a stronger level
than the pre-euro economic fundamentals (including the nominal interest rates that would prevail if
euro adoption was not expected) would justify. The revaluations of the Slovak koruna in the ERM II
might possibly be seen as a part of this process.
For Slovakia, in the alternative scenario, all the variables on the adjustment path seem to be less
volatile. It is then highly probable that a welfare analysis run with this model would indicate it as
a preferable scenario. However, to con￿rm this in general, a much more sophisticated investigation
would have to be repeated in a large-scale model with a more detailed sectoral breakdown, ￿nancial
constraints and frictions, investment and multiple stages of production. The case seems to be even more
d￿cult to assess for Poland, as consumption and tradable output exhibit some overshooting pattern
under the alternative scenario. A detailed analysis of this issue would also need a more elaborate
application of the permanent shock (i.e. a gradual fall in interest rates, as agents start to discount
euro area entry in their expectations).
In general, both scenarios might have their advantages and disadvantages whose thorough consideration
exceeds the depth of this analysis. The market-based scenario (dashed lines) would probably induce
a prolongued period of higher in￿ation, which seems to be particularly dangerous for expectations in
countries with a short history of low in￿ation. Here, on the contrary, rationality of expectations was
34Figure 7: Permanent 1 p.p. shock in nominal interest rates
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35Table 5: Persistence of structural stress in monetary policy vs required terms of trade appreciation
time of natural rate disparity [years] expected by agents 25 30 35 40 45 50
corresponding c 0.955 0.962 0.968 0.972 0.975 0.977
permanent terms of trade appreciation ￿ PL 8.42 9.94 11.79 13.45 15.05 16.35
permanent terms of trade appreciation ￿ SK 2.17 2.57 3.07 3.51 3.94 4.28
assumed. This scenario might also be undesirable when the in￿ation persistence or price rigidities
are high. On the other hand, the revaluation-based scenario (solid lines) could potentially hit the
tradable sector severely, including advanced and innovative branches. In Slovakia (see Figure 7), a
sharp drop of the tradable output was observed. This would put the producers of tradable goods under
substantial time pressure. On the contrary, under gradual appreciation, they would have more time
for the necessary restructuring processes.
7 Conclusion
In this paper, we attempted to compare Poland’s and Slovakia’s capacity to absorb macroeconomic
asymmetric shocks in the euro area. We also considered a permanent fall in the nominal interest rates
as a stimulus, shifting the economy to a new, ￿mid-term￿ steady state. For this purpose, we applied
a New Keynesian DSGE model of a 2-region, 2-sector currency union, including various sources of
cross-regional heterogeneity.
The estimates suggest that, when it comes to the competitiveness channel, Slovakia is better equipped
to adjust after asymmetric demand shocks than Poland. This di￿erence is moderate, and it mainly
stems from the fact that Slovakia is a smaller, more open economy with higher elasticity of substitution
between the foreign and domestic tradable consumption. This should make the competitiveness channel
￿ a mechanism of adjustment via external and internal demand for domestic tradables ￿ more e￿cient.
The picture after cost-push shocks in both sectors is somewhat more nuanced, but does not
substantially a￿ect the general conclusion. After an adverse shock, an economic slowdown in the
tradable sector in Slovakia ￿ given the estimated parametrisation ￿ could be deeper than in Poland,
as adverse supply-side developments hit more severely its external competitiveness. On the contrary,
the adjustment in Polish production is ￿atter but slower than in the Slovak case.
When the fall in nominal interest rates is persistent, the economy shifts to a di￿erent position. The main
feature of this permanent adjustment is an appreciation of external terms of trade. Its quantitative
assessment strongly depends on the assumption how long the natural interest rate di￿erential will last.
With a 30-year long period of real convergence, the estimated terms of trade appreciation for Poland
is 9:9%, whereby for Slovakia 2:6%. This di￿erence is intuitive, given the fact that the Polish economy
is less sensitive to external competitiveness developments than the Slovak one.
The latter ￿nding suggests that the ultimate conversion rate could to some extent be considered as a
tool faciliating the transition to the new equilibrium point. However, the impact of such measure on
the tradable sector requires a more profound investigation.
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